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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to investigate how and why people misperceive the magnitude of 
economic differences. It was hypothesized that news consumption frequency, rationality and 
abstract-mindedness would predict accuracy in estimations of economic differences; and that 
economic ideology motivation would predict inaccuracy in estimations of economic differences. 
Moreover, it was hypothesized that greater levels of concrete-mindedness and economic 
conservatism would predict underestimation of economic differences, whereas greater levels of 
concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism would predict overestimation of economic 
differences. Data was collected by means of a questionnaire and consisted of responses from 223 
participants. Perceptions of economic differences were measured by comparing participants’ 
estimations with objective data. Results indicated that the hypotheses were supported to various 
degrees depending on the format of the estimation items. When estimation items were formulated 
in terms of absolute quantities results showed that (a) news consumption frequency predicted 
accuracy, (b) economic ideology motivation predicted inaccuracy, (c) economic conservatism 
predicted underestimation, and (d) economic liberalism predicted overestimation. When 
estimation items were formulated in terms of proportions results indicated that (a) cognitive 
reflection predicted accuracy, (b) abstract-mindedness and economic conservatism jointly 
predicted underestimation, and (c) concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism jointly 
predicted underestimation. The results suggest that items measuring perceptions of economic 
differences are more valid when expressed in terms of absolute quantities. The study contributes 
to construal level theory and system justification theory, as it reveals that the direction of 
misperceptions of economic differences depend on the interaction of abstract-mindedness and 
political-economic ideology. 
 
Keywords: ideology, system justification, construal level theory, media, 
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Individual Differences in (Mis)perceptions of Economic Inequality: The Role of Ideology, 
Abstraction, News Consumption and Rationality 
 
Rising income and wealth disparity was rated the single most important trend in 
determining global developments over the next 10 years in World Economic Forum’s latest 
Global Risk Report (2017). In addition, a recent poll survey revealed that most people are wrong 
in their estimations of the magnitude of various global issues, such as distribution of wealth in 
society (Ipsos MORI, 2016). Based on data from 40 countries, the study showed that people tend 
to overestimate how well wealth is distributed in their country. Notably, Swedish participants 
guessed that 20% of the population’s wealth belongs to the poorer 70%, when in reality only 11% 
does. Several other studies have revealed similar results, showing that people tend to misperceive 
the magnitude of economic differences (e.g., Chambers, Swan and Heesecker, 2014; Headey, 
1991; Kaplowitz, Broman & Fisher, 2006; Kaplowitz, Fisher & Broman, 2003; Norton & Ariely, 
2011). Furthermore, a plethora of studies have shown that—for both disadvantaged and 
advantaged individuals—increased economic differences are associated with negative outcomes 
such as decreased health, happiness, trust and overall economic growth; and increased crime level 
and social dysfunction (e.g., Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner & Prothrow-Stith, 1997; Napier & Jost, 
2008; Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener, 2011; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010; Wilkinson & Picket, 2006; 
Uslaner & Brown, 2005).  
The question as to why people tend to be inaccurate in their estimations of global issues 
such as economic inequality has not yet received any consistent answers within psychological 
research. Studies have shown varying results, partly since in some studies people have tended to 
underestimate the magnitude of economic differences (Headey, 1991;  Kaplowitz et al., 2003, 
2006; Norton & Ariely, 2011; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012), while in others they have 
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overestimated the magnitude of economic differences (Chambers et al., 2014). What is more, 
only a few studies have been conducted in order to investigate the underlying factors of 
misperceptions of economic differences. I will briefly describe those studies and their findings 
next. 
 
Previous Research Explaining Misperceptions of Economic Differences 
At the outset, Headey’s (1991) correlational study showed that Australians generally 
underestimate the magnitude of economic differences in society. Additionally, the study showed 
that peoples’ perceptions of the magnitude of economic differences are in line with their 
perceptions of how large they think economic differences ought to be. This means that the greater 
economic differences in society people consider legitimate, the greater economic differences they 
perceive to exist. Thus, the finding that people underestimate the magnitude of economic 
differences indicates that people generally think there should be less economic differences in 
society than there actually are. For instance, Headey’s (1991) study showed that working-class 
people underestimate the magnitude of economic differences to a greater extent than upper-class 
people do. Headey (1991) linked this result to the theory of cognitive dissonance reduction 
(Festinger, 1957), suggesting that working-class people underestimate economic inequality as 
way of decreasing their sense of social injustice by bringing their estimations closer to their ideal. 
Additionally, Headey (1991) also speculated that people underestimate economic differences due 
to the low salience of distributive issues in the media. 
The general tendency to underestimate the magnitude of economic differences was also 
found in two sets of studies by Kaplowitz et al. (2003; 2006). Moreover, their studies revealed 
that Whites underestimate economic differences between Blacks and Whites to a greater extent 
than Blacks and that underestimations of economic differences were associated with lower levels 
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of the belief that discrimination against Blacks continues. Kaplowitz et al. (2003; 2006) 
advocated that increased knowledge about economic differences and the continuing 
discrimination of Blacks would decrease misperceptions of economic differences. 
Another attempt to empirically test why people misperceive the magnitude of actual 
economic differences was made in a study by Norton and Ariely (2011), which attempted to 
identify the relationship between political orientation and misperceptions of economic differences 
in America. The results revealed that all participants—regardless of political orientation or level 
of income—tended to underestimate economic differences, while also desiring a more 
economically equal society. Norton and Ariely (2011) suggested that people underestimate 
economic differences to a great extent because of a shared desire among all political groups to 
live in a more egalitarian society than current America. However, Norton and Ariely’s (2011) 
approach to measuring people’s estimates of economic differences was evaluated by Eriksson 
and Simpson (2012) as leading to responses heavily influenced by anchoring bias (Epley & 
Gilovich, 2006). Eriksson & Simpson (2012) argued that because estimation items in Norton & 
Ariely’s (2011) study were framed in terms of how much of total national income that was 
distributed to each quintile of the population, respondents either misunderstood the question or 
avoided the required calculation of perceived average incomes of each quintile into percent. In 
turn, this led to responses being more anchored towards an equal distribution, and thus to greater 
underestimations of economic differences. Eriksson and Simpson (2012) attempted to resolve the 
methodological issues in Norton & Ariely’s (2011) study by using a measure that required less 
numeric skills. Their study showed that with this measure people underestimated economic 
differences to some degree, but not to the same extent as in Norton and Ariely’s (2011) study.  
Contrary to Headey’s (1991), Kaplowitz et al.’s (2003; 2006), Norton and Ariely’s (2011) 
and Eriksson and Simpson’s (2012) studies, a study by Chambers et al. (2014) showed that 
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Americans generally overestimate economic differences, even when controlling for the influence 
of participants’ income and education level. Their results indicated that this is because people 
tend to exaggerate the income of top earners, while underestimating the average income of the 
general population. Chambers et al. (2014) suggested that this in turn may be a result of “popular 
media’s widespread reporting of high unemployment rates, the stagnant economy, and the 
genuine rise in wealth inequality” (p. 617). Furthermore, Chambers et al. (2014) found that 
liberals overestimate the magnitude of economic differences to a greater extent than 
conservatives do. They explained their result by referring to research showing that liberals tend to 
view the economic state of society more pessimistically than conservatives do (Duch, Palmer & 
Anderson, 2000; Schlenker, Chambers & Le, 2012), and therefore overestimate the magnitude of  
economic differences to a greater extent than conservatives. 
In sum, previous research that has examined how people misperceive the magnitude of 
economic differences have shown both that people generally underestimate economic differences 
(Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Headey, 1991; Kaplowitz et al., 2003, 2006; Norton & Ariely, 
2011), and that people generally overestimate economic differences (Chambers et al., 2014). 
Speculations in previous studies as to why people misperceive the magnitude of economic 
differences have been that (a) people underestimate economic differences as a way of reducing 
feelings of social injustice and/or because of the low salience of distributive issues in the media 
(Headey, 1991), (b) underestimations are due to lack of knowledge about the continuing 
discrimination of those less privileged by the economic system (Kaplowitz et al., 2003; 2006), (c) 
underestimations of economic differences are due to a desire to live in a more economically just 
society (Norton & Ariely, 2011), (d) people overestimate economic differences because of the 
wide-spread reporting of economic inequality and unemployment rates in the media, and (e) 
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compared to conservatives, liberals overestimate economic differences to a greater extent because 
they have a more pessimistic view on economic conditions in society (Chambers et al., 2014). 
 
The Current Study 
Despite the lack of empirically tested explanations as to why people misperceive the 
magnitude of economic differences, some suggestions have been put forth in previous research 
and some suggestions can be derived from psychological theories. The current study aims to 
empirically test some of these suggestions.  
Firstly, a potential factor that has been suggested to influence perceptions of the 
magnitude of economic differences is the reporting of economic differences in the media. On the 
one hand, Headey (1991) speculated that his results that people tend to underestimate economic 
differences were due to the low salience of distributive issues in the media. On the other hand, 
Chambers et al. (2014) hypothesized that their results indicating that people overestimate 
economic differences could be explained by the high salience of distributive issues in the media. 
Furthermore, Kaplowitz et al. (2003; 2006) attributed their findings that people underestimate 
economic differences to lack of accurate knowledge about economic differences and 
discrimination of those disfavored by the economic system. A reconciliation of these suggestions 
is proposed in the present study by assuming that, in general, news in Swedish media accurately 
report levels of economic differences. Assuming this, it would be expected that those who 
consume news more frequently and use valid news sources would have more accurate 
perceptions of the magnitude of economic differences in various societies.  
 
H1: Frequency of news consumption predicts accuracy in estimations of economic 
differences. 
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Furthermore, misperceptions of the magnitude of economic differences have been 
suggested to be influenced by availability bias (Castillo, 2011; Evans, Kelley & Kolosi, 1992) 
and anchoring bias (Castillo, 2011; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Wegener, 1990). While 
availability bias implies basing one’s judgment on the most recent or immediate information that 
comes to mind under uncertain conditions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), anchoring bias implies 
basing one’s judgment on the most available information and adjusting it until it reaches a 
plausible estimate (Epley & Gilovich, 2006).  An example of an availability bias in the case of 
estimating economic differences would be if one erroneously estimates the average income for a 
certain group by basing one’s judgment on the most easily retrievable information about incomes 
for that group, such as the income of a friend who belongs to that group. An example of an 
anchoring bias would be if one erroneously estimates the average income for a group by basing 
one’s judgment on the most easily retrievable information about incomes for that group, and then 
adjusting that value until it reaches a subjectively reasonable estimate. 
Relatedly, being rational—as opposed to being intelligent—implies overcoming the 
influence of cognitive biases by being critical, basing one’s beliefs on available evidence and 
assessing probability and base rates coherently (Baron, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2014). Whereas 
intelligence refers to cognitive abilities in processing information and using knowledge structures 
(Carroll, 1993), rationality is a more encompassing construct which also entails abilities in 
judgments and decision-making (Stanovich & West, 2014). More generally, rationality refers to 
adaptive responding, good judgment, and good decision making (Stanovich, West & Toplak, 
2016). Thus, rationality may prevent the influence of cognitive biases when estimating the 
magnitude of economic differences and consequently lead to more accurate judgments. 
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H2: Rationality predicts accuracy in estimations of economic differences. 
 
Another factor that has been investigated in relation to the degree of accuracy in 
estimations of economic differences is economic-political ideology. Whereas some studies have 
indicated that both liberals and conservatives underestimate the magnitude of economic 
inequality (Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Headey, 1991; Norton & Ariely, 2011), others have 
shown that both liberals and conservatives overestimate the magnitude of economic inequality, 
but liberals do so to a greater extent (Chambers et al., 2014). In order to get a clearer view of how 
economic-political ideologies relate to misperceptions of economic differences, the present study 
aims to investigate whether the extent to which one is motivated by economic-political ideology 
predicts inaccuracy in estimations of economic differences. Studies on motivated reasoning have 
shown that people are motivated to seek information that are in line with their already held 
beliefs (Kunda, 1990), which implies that politically held beliefs influence perceptions of socio-
political issues (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Wagner, Tarlov & Vivyan, 2012). The notion that those 
who hold stronger ideological beliefs have a more distorted world-view has received support 
from both heuristic research paradigms (Lupia, 1994; Kinsey & Popkin, 1993) and cultural 
cognitive theory (Gastil, Braman, Kahan & Slovic, 2011; Jost,  Ledgerwood & Hardin, 2008; 
Reedy, Wells & Gastil, 2014; Wells, Reedy,  Gastil & Lee, 2009). While the heuristic research 
paradigms take a micro-perspective by suggesting that distorted world-views are a result of 
biased information processing, research within cultural cognitive theory take a macro-perspective 
by assuming that misperceptions are a result of contextual influences such as culturally held 
belief systems (Reedy et al., 2014). Linking these findings to the perception of economic 
differences, it is hypothesized that stronger economic ideology motivation (i.e. strongly held 
economic ideology beliefs) predicts lower accuracy in estimations of economic differences. 
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H3: Economic ideology motivation predicts inaccuracy in estimations of economic 
differences. 
 
In addition to the influences of frequency of news consumption, rationality and ideology 
motivation; I suggest that individual differences in tendency to think abstractly may be associated 
with the degree to which one misperceives the level of economic differences. Given that accurate 
perceptions of the magnitude of economic differences imply considering differences in wealth for 
a whole population, economic inequality is most likely construed as an abstract concept that is 
psychologically distant to the perceiver. A theory that provides a theoretical framework for the 
presence of individual differences in abstract thinking and perception of psychologically distant 
concepts is construal level theory (CLT; Liberman & Trope, 2008). CLT posits that perceptions 
of objects and events vary depending on their psychological distance to the perceiver. 
Psychologically distant events are construed as abstract, superordinate and decontextualized 
representations; whereas psychologically close events are construed as concrete, subordinate and 
contextualized representations (Liberman, Sagristano & Trope, 2002). The relationship between 
abstraction and psychological distance has been shown to be bi-directional (Bar-Anan, Liberman 
& Trope, 2006), meaning that abstract objects and events are construed as psychologically distant 
and that psychologically distant objects and events are construed as abstract concepts. 
Psychological distance can vary temporally (now vs. future/past), spatially (here vs. there) and 
socially (me vs. someone else), and can also vary in level of hypotheticality (Wakslak, Trope, 
Liberman & Alony, 2006). Thus, economic inequality could be considered an abstract concept 
that can vary in psychological distance on all dimensions (i.e. temporally, spatially, socially and 
hypothetically). 
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Relating to perceptions of psychologically distant concepts, studies have indicated that 
people who are in an abstract mindset (a) perceive information in contexts of broader patterns 
(Fujita & Roberts, 2010; Ledgerwood, Wakslak, &Wang, 2010), (b) more easily retrieve 
psychologically distant information (Liberman & Trope, 2008), and (c) make more accurate 
predictions and evaluations about psychologically distant events (Liberman & Trope, 2008; 
Nussbaum, Liberman & Trope, 2006; Peetz & Buehler, 2012; Wening, Keith & Abele, 2016). 
What is more, the existence of individual differences in abstract thinking has been indicated in 
various studies (e.g., Agerström & Björklund, 2013; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), which means 
that people generally differ in whether they tend to think abstractly or concretely about objects 
and events. Based on these findings, it is hypothesized that individual differences in abstract-
mindedness is related to higher accuracy in estimations of the magnitude of economic 
differences. 
 
H4: Abstract-mindedness predicts accuracy in estimations of the magnitude of economic 
differences, even when controlling for the influence of news consumption, rationality and 
economic ideology motivation. 
 
Considering the inconsistent results concerning the association between political-
economic ideologies and the direction of estimations of economic differences (i.e. under- or 
overestimations), the present study also aims to investigate this relationship further. What 
empirical studies on this issue have shown so far is that (a) both liberals and conservatives 
underestimate the magnitude of economic inequality (Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Headey, 1991; 
Norton & Ariely, 2011), and (b) both liberals and conservatives overestimate the magnitude of 
economic inequality, but liberals do so to a greater extent (Chambers et al., 2014). Clearly, no 
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conclusion about the association between political-economic ideologies and the direction of 
estimations of economic differences can be drawn from these results. However, suggestions for 
how political-economic ideologies are associated with accuracy in estimations of economic 
differences could be derived from various theories.  
One such theory is system justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994). According to 
SJT people justify the systems in which they are a part as way of satisfying epistemic, existential 
and relational needs (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Epistemic needs refers to reducing uncertainty and 
instability, existential needs refers to reducing feelings of threat and relational needs refers to 
belonging in a group which shares one’s beliefs (Jost et al., 2008). For instance, studies have 
shown that those who have lower needs for cognition, greater death anxiety and stronger desire to 
share reality are significantly more system justifying (Hennes, Nam, Stern & Jost, 2012).  System 
justification as a form of motivational cognition has been affirmed by research indicating that 
system justification is motivated by (a) individual differences in self-deception and ideology 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003), (b) situational cues such as system threat (Kay, Jost 
& Young, 2005), and (c) biased information processing (Haines & Jost, 2000; Ledgerwood, 
Mandisodza, Jost & Pohl, 2011). A sub theory of SJT that focuses only on the legitimization of 
economic norms is economic system justification (ESJ; Jost & Thomspson, 2000). In terms of 
misperceptions of economic differences, studies have shown that since justifying the economic 
system implies perceiving it as more equal, those higher on ESJ estimate economic differences to 
be smaller and more like their ideal (Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017; Willis, Rodríguez-Baílon, 
López-Rodrígues & García-Sánchez, 2015).  
In terms of the relationship between political ideologies and perception of economic 
differences, studies have shown that conservatives view economic-societal conditions more 
positively and thus perceive economic differences to be smaller, whereas liberals view economic 
MISPERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 13 
conditions more pessimistically and thus perceive economic differences to be larger (Chambers, 
Swan, & Heesacker, 2014, 2015; Duch et al., 2000; Schlenker et al., 2012). Further support for 
this relationship between political ideology and estimation of economic differences can be found 
in research based on the multidimensional threat model (MET; Hirschberger, Ein-dor, Leidner & 
Saguy, 2016). In terms of economic inequality as a form of existential threat, the MET model 
classifies it as a symbolic threat. Symbolic threats makes salient group differences in morals, 
values, standards, beliefs and attitudes and are distinguished from realistic threats, which are 
related to the safety, health or well-being of one’s in-group (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Symbolic 
threats have been shown to be more emphasized by liberals (Kahn, Björklund & Hirschberger, 
2017). Based on these findings, because liberals perceive economic inequality to be a greater 
existential threat than conservatives and therefore emphasize it to a greater extent, liberals may 
also estimate economic differences to be greater.  
ESJ and conservatism in regards to economic issues (i.e. pro-market economy and against 
redistribution of resources) are highly connected constructs (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000; Jost, 
Nosek & Gosling, 2008; Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017) and will therefore be combined into one 
measure of political-economic ideology in the present study, ranging from economic liberalism to 
economic conservatism. All in all, previous research suggests that compared to economically 
liberal people, economically conservative people perceive economic differences to be smaller. 
However, this association has not been investigated in terms of how accurately economic 
differences are perceived when compared with actual data. The present study aims to integrate 
the empirical findings that economic conservatism is associated with perceiving smaller 
economic differences and the previously stated hypothesis that abstract-mindedness is associated 
with greater accuracy in estimations of economic differences. Specifically, since the previously 
stated hypothesis implies that concrete-mindedness is associated with inaccuracy in estimations 
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of economic differences, it is hypothesized that concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism 
are associated with underestimation of economic differences, even when controlling for news 
consumption, rationality and economic ideology motivation. 
 
H5: Being concrete-minded and economically conservative predicts underestimation 
economic differences, even when controlling for the influence of news consumption, 
rationality and economic ideology motivation. 
 
Similarly, based on the previously stated hypotheses of this study and research showing 
that economically liberal people perceive economic differences to be greater than economically 
conservative people, it is hypothesized that concrete-mindedness and economical liberalism 
together predicts overestimation of the magnitude of economic differences. 
 
H6: Being concrete-minded and economically liberal predicts overestimation of economic 
differences, even when controlling for the influence of news consumption, rationality and 
economic ideology motivation. 
 
In summary, it is hypothesized that frequency of news consumption and rationality 
independently predict accuracy in estimations of economic differences, whereas economic 
ideology motivation predicts inaccuracy in estimations of economic differences. Further, it is 
hypothesized that abstract-mindedness is associated with accuracy in estimations of economic 
differences, even when controlling for news consumption, rationality and economic ideology 
motivation. It is also hypothesized that concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism jointly 
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predict underestimation of economic differences and that concrete-mindedness and economic 
liberalism jointly predict overestimation of economic differences. 
By examining the relationship between these underlying psychological factors and 
misperceptions of economic differences, this study aims to contribute to the somewhat scant and 
inconsistent psychological research that has been conducted in this area so far. Firstly, the study 
may do so by investigating the influence of factors that have not been investigated in this area 
before. Secondly, by also examining the already empirically tested relationship between 
economic-political ideology and misperceptions of economic differences, the study may serve to 
unravel the inconsistent results in this area by examining the relationship from a novel point of 
view and by using various methodological approaches.  
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 226 individuals participated in the study. Two participants were omitted from 
the data analysis because they were under the age of 18 and one was omitted because their scores 
violated the assumption of multivariate normality by having a Mahalanobis distance value well 
below the recommended threshold of p >.001. The remaining sample consisted of 70% (n = 156) 
women, 29% (n = 65) men and 1 % (n = 2) who did not state their gender. The age of the 
participants varied from 18 to 69 years (M = 34, SD = 12) and 92% (n = 206) of the participants 
were born in Sweden, while 8% (n = 17) were born outside of Sweden. The participants’ average 
monthly income was 20366 SEK (median = 15000, SD = 28668). Eighteen percent (n = 40) of 
the participants had a low economic standard (i.e., an income below 50% of the median income 
in Sweden), while 8% (n = 18) of the participants had a high economic standard (i.e., an income 
above 200% of the median income in Sweden).  
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Materials  
Using a cross-sectional design approach, variables were measured by having participants 
indicate their responses in a questionnaire.  
Independent variables. Variables used as predictors were frequency of news 
consumption, rationality, economic ideology motivation, economic-political ideology and 
abstract-mindedness. All predictors were measured with extant scales which were translated into 
Swedish prior to data collection. The quality of translations was checked for by having the 
Swedish items back translated by a second source. Phrasings in back-translated items that were 
semantically different from the original English items were rephrased for better fit. All 
continuous scales for the predictor variables were aggregated into indexes of responses prior to 
data analysis.  
News consumption. Items measuring news consumption frequency were collected from 
the Swedish SOM institute’s annual report of Swedish citizens’ news consumption habits 
(Arkhede & Ohlsson, 2015). The news consumption scale in the current study consisted of five 
items for which participants rated their news consumption frequency for various news sources 
such as evening papers, daily papers, national radio, national TV and national Radio- or TV 
service on the web. Frequency was rated on a scale for which 1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = once per 
month, 4 = a few times per month, 5 = a few times per week and 6 = every day. Because using one 
of the named news sources regularly does not necessarily imply that one regularly uses any of the 
other news sources regularly as well, the internal consistency of the scale was expected to be low. 
This fact was reflected in the very low Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .54. Thus, the low 
homogeneity of the news consumption items is considered tolerable in this study given that the 
items measure frequency of consuming news from various kinds of sources.  
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Rationality. Two instruments aiming to measure different facets of rationality were 
included in the present study, namely the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and 
the Actively Open-minded Thinking Beliefs scale (AOT; Baron, Scott, Fincher & Emlen Metz, 
2015). The CRT and the AOT are established measures of rationality and are included in 
Stanovich et al.’s (2016) Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking. 
The CRT measures the extent to which one relies on reflective (vs. intuitive) cognitive 
processing (Frederick, 2005). It consists of three open-ended questions, each asking for the 
correct answer to a mathematic problem that is presented in a way that facilitates responding 
based on intuition in lieu of reflective processing. One of the items is the “bat and ball” problem 
that goes “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?”. The most common incorrect response to this problem is ‘10 cents’, which 
indicates an inclination to process information intuitively. The correct response, ‘5 cents’, 
indicates a tendency to use more reflective cognitive processing. Participants’ level of cognitive 
reflection was operationalized as the number of correct responses on the three CRT items, 
ranging from 0 to 3. The internal consistency of the CRT has been quite high in previous studies 
(Cronbach’s alpha around .6), considering the shortness of the scale (Baron et al., 2015), and the 
alpha was .6 in the current study too. 
The aspect of rationality that refers to actively open-minded thinking was measured using 
the AOT scale. The AOT measures the tendency to consider new evidence against favored 
beliefs, patience in problem-solving and the extent to which one believes actively open-minded 
thinking to be a desirable trait (Baron et al., 2015; Haran, Ritov & Mellers, 2013). Actively open-
minded thinking has also been shown to be associated with lower susceptibility to cognitive 
biases (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999). The scale consists of 
eight items, which are rated on a Likert scale, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally 
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agree). An example of an item from the AOT is “People should take into consideration evidence 
that goes against their beliefs”. The internal consistency of the AOT in the current study was 
somewhat low as Cronbach’s alpha = .64. 
Political-economic ideology. Political-economic ideology was measured using two scales; 
the Economic System Justification Scale (ESJ; Jost & Thompson, 2000) and a political-economic 
conservatism scale (Harnish, Bridges & Gump, 2017; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994). The ESJ scale aims to measure the ideological tendency to legitimize economic 
differences in society and has been shown to correlate highly with political conservatism (Jost & 
Thompson., 2000). Whereas the original scale consists of seventeen items, a brief 7-item version 
of the scale by Jost et al. (2012) was administered in this study. The items were rated on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) and an example of an item on the ESJ 
scale is “Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s achievements”. The original 
17-item scale had a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .73 (Jost & Thompson., 2000) and the same 
Cronbach’s alpha value was achieved for the 7-item scale in the current study.  
Political-economic ideology was also measured with the political-economic conservatism 
scale by Pratto et al. (1994), which consists of three items assessing level of conservatism with 
regards to social, economic and foreign policy issues. The participants rated how 
liberal/conservative they considered themselves to be for each type of issue on a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). Inspired by Harnish et al. (2017), the item 
measuring liberalism/conservatism with regards to economic issues was the only item included in 
the measure of political-economic ideology in the present study.  
ESJ correlated strongly with the economic conservatism item from Pratto et al.’s (1994) 
political-economic conservatism scale (r = .59, p < .001). Putting them together into an 8-item 
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political-economic ideology scale gave a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .77. The merged scale 
was therefore used in the data analysis as a measure of political-economic ideology. 
Economic ideology motivation. The extent to which participants were motivated by their 
political-economic ideology was operationalized as the strength of identification with either side 
of the political-economic ideology scale described in the previous section. Since the political-
economic ideology scale was a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative), 
economic ideology motivation was operationalized as the number of scores away from the middle 
score of the political-economic ideology scale. Thus, economic ideology motivation was 
measured by coding the middle score of the political-economic ideology scale as 0, and each 
score above or below the middle score as +1 (i.e., scores of 1 and 7 on the political-economic 
ideology scale were each coded as 3). Cronbach’s alpha for the 8 items in the economic ideology 
motivation scale was .73. 
Abstract-mindedness. Individual differences in tendency to think abstractly or concretely 
were measured with the Behavior Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). The BIF 
consists of 25 items that measure the level of action identification for various actions. For each 
item, the respondent is asked to indicate whether an action (e.g. “writing a list”) is best described 
as a high level identification (e.g., “getting organized”) or as a low level identification (e.g., 
“writing things down”). Abstract-mindedness is operationalized as high-level identifications of 
actions, whereas concrete thinking is operationalized as low-level identification of actions (Smith 
& Trope, 2006). Participants’ level of abstract-mindedness was defined as the total number of 
high-level identifications chosen of the 25 items. In the item for which the action to be identified 
was “paying rent”, the original option “writing a check” was changed into “transferring money” 
because this was considered a more up-to-date description of the action. The BIF showed high 
reliability within the sample as Cronbach’s alpha = .83.  
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Dependent variables. Three dependent variables were used to test the hypotheses: 
namely, (a) the degree of absolute deviance in estimation of economic differences (b) the degree 
of underestimation of economic differences, and (c) the degree of overestimation of economic 
differences. Each dependent variable was based on a special computation of one deviance 
variable, which was measured by using items constructed specifically for the present study.  
The deviance variable. The deviance score that was used to compute each dependent 
variable was calculated by subtracting participants’ estimations of the magnitude of economic 
differences with the objective magnitude of economic differences. The type of questions about 
economic differences included in the questionnaire was thus reliant on what kind of objective 
data that could be found on the matter. The objective data that estimation scores were compared 
to in order to create the deviance score were retrieved from SCB’s (2017a; 2017b) and OECD’s 
(2017b) databases on economic differences.  
The deviance score was based on items asking participants to estimate (a) the average 
income of various income groups (e.g., the richest 10 % and the poorest 10 %), (b) the share of 
total national income distributed to each quintile of the population, (c) the proportion of people 
with high economic standard in the population, and (d) the proportion of people with low 
economic standard in the population. Because I intended to measure deviance in estimations of 
economic differences in general, deviance scores were obtained not only for psychologically 
close populations (i.e., in Sweden in recent years), but also temporally distant (i.e., in Sweden 20 
years ago) and spatially distant populations (i.e., in Germany and the US). The instrument 
measuring deviance in estimation of economic differences consisted of 22 items and since 
deviance scores were indicated on different scales, all the deviance scores were transformed into 
Z scores before they were computed into each of the dependent variables.  As way of increasing 
validity, deviance scores were obtained using various response formats, which can be divided 
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into multiple-choice items and free-response items. Multiple-choice items were responded to in 
terms of relative quantities (i.e., proportions) and with visual aid, whereas free-response items 
were responded to in terms of absolute quantities (i.e. average income) and without visual aid. A 
compilation of all items that were used to measure deviance in estimations of economic 
differences, categorized by response format, can be seen in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  
Each item measuring deviance in estimation of economic differences, categorized by question type 
(columns) and psychological distance dimension (rows). 
 Multiple-choice   Free-Response 
Psychologically 
close 
Population quintiles’ shares of 
total national income in 
Sweden in 2015 
 
Proportion of high income 
earners in Sweden in 2015 
 
Proportion of low income 
earners in Sweden in 2013 
 
 Ratio between the income of the richest 
20% and the poorest 20% of the 
population 
 
Ratio between the income of the richest 
10% and the poorest 10% of the 
population 
 
Palma ratio 
 
Ratio between the income of women 
and men 
 
Ratio between the income of 
immigrants and people born in Sweden 
 
Temporally distant Population quintiles’ shares of 
total national income in 
Sweden 1995 
 
Proportion of high income 
earners in Sweden 1995 
 
Proportion of low income 
earners in Sweden 1995 
 
 Ratio between the income of the richest 
20% and the poorest 20% of the 
population 
 
Ratio between the income of the richest 
10% and the poorest 10% of the 
population 
 
Palma ratio 
 
Spatially distant 1  Proportion of low income 
earners in Germany 2013 
 
 Ratio between the income of the richest 
20% and the poorest 20 % in Germany 
 
Ratio between the income of the richest 
10% and the poorest 10 % in Germany 
 
Palma ratio 
 
Spatially distant 2 Proportion of low income 
earners in the US in 2013  
 Ratio between the income of the richest 
20% and the poorest 20% in the US 
 
Ratio between the income of the richest 
10% and the poorest 10% in the US 
 
Palma ratio 
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Multiple-choice items. Eight of the items measuring deviance were presented as multiple-
choice questions. Responses were selected by participants among several alternatives, one of 
which represented the correct response and the other alternatives being distractors which 
represented different degrees of under- or overestimation of economic differences. The method 
used for constructing the multiple-choice distractors was inspired by Ali, Carr and Ruit’s study 
(2016), in which the distractors were based on participants’ most frequent incorrect responses to 
the same items presented as free-response questions in a pilot study. Furthermore, multiple-
choice items were constructed in accordance with extant guidelines based on reviews, empirical 
assessment and application of the properties of validity (Haladyna, Downing & Rodriguez, 2002; 
Moreno, Martínez & Muñiz, 2015). This implied adapting the content and style of stems and 
distractors to be in line with validated presentation formats for multiple-choice items. 
The number of distractors in multiple-choice items ranged from 4-6 and it was possible to 
either underestimate or overestimate the magnitude of economic differences in each multiple-
choice item. Correct responses were coded as 0 and for each overestimating response the score 
was coded as +1 (i.e., overestimating a little was coded as 1, overestimating more was coded as 
2, etc.). For each underestimating response the score was coded as -1 (i.e., underestimating a little 
was coded as -1, underestimating more was coded as -2, etc.). The coded response constituted the 
deviance score for each item. 
Free-response items. Fourteen items measuring deviance in estimation of economic 
differences were presented as free-response items. For these items, participants were asked to 
estimate the average income of various income groups (e.g., the richest 10% and the poorest 
10%). These estimations were then calculated into ratios representing the economic differences 
between income groups. For instance, the ratio representing the estimated economic difference 
between the richest 10% and the poorest 10% would be calculated by dividing the estimated 
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average income of the richest 10% by the estimated average income of the poorest 10%. 
Deviance scores for five different ratios indicating level of economic differences could be 
computed using responses to these items; namely, the ratio between the income of the richest 
20% and the poorest 20%, the ratio between the income of the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, 
the ratio between the share of national income of the richest 10% and the poorest 40% (also 
known as Palma ratio; Palma, 2011), the ratio between the income of men and women, and the 
ratio between the income of immigrants and people born in Sweden. 
The deviance score for each item was computed by subtracting the natural logarithm of 
the estimated income ratio with the natural logarithm of the actual income ratio. Hence, a 
deviance score of 0 implied a correct estimation of economic differences, whereas a deviance 
score of >0 implied an overestimation of economic differences and a deviance score of <0 
implied an underestimation of economic differences. The natural logarithms of the ratios were 
used instead of raw ratio estimation scores because it has been found to be an appropriate method 
to use when measuring economic differences (Becker, 1975; Jasso, 1980; Jasso & Wegener, 
1997; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000; Willis et al., 2015).  The reason for 
this is that it takes into account that the differences in income among rich people have a lower 
weight than differences among poor people. Further, income ratios were used as a measurement 
of estimation of economic differences instead of absolute income estimations because it shifts 
focus from currency units to the relative income hierarchy (Castillo, 2011; Kelley & Zagorski, 
2004).  
Validity of the deviance variable. Because responses to items measuring the deviance in 
estimations of economic differences were to be indicated by the participants in terms of numbers, 
consideration had to be taken to ensure that the items were easy to understand and independent of 
the participants’ level of numeracy. To this end, each item was constructed by utilizing at least 
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one of two strategies, namely, (a) to use visual displays as a way of communicating numerical 
relations inherent in the items (i.e. multiple-choice items in the present study), and (b) to 
construct item responses in terms of absolute quantities instead of relative quantities and 
probabilities (i.e. free-response questions in the present study). The latter method has been 
recommended to use in order to increase validity in numeracy measures, because most people 
find it easier to think in absolute rather than relative terms (e.g., Bodemer, Meder & Gigerenzer, 
2014; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke & Woloshin, 2007; 
Lautenbach, Christensen, Sparks & Green, 2013; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein & Pardo, 2012). 
However, because objective data on economic differences is often presented as proportions of 
income, some items required responses expressed as relative quantities. For those items, care was 
taken to make it as easy as possible for participants to understand the meaning of the items by 
using pie charts as visual aid and using multiple-choice as response format. Research has shown 
that pie charts facilitate understanding of numerical concepts (e.g. Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 
2013; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Hawley et al., 2008; Lautenbach et al., 2013; Smit et 
al., 2016) and that presenting items as multiple-choice increases the number of correct responses 
relative to when presenting them as free-response items (Ali et al., 2016; Norman, 1988; Norman 
et al., 1987; Schuwirth & Donkers, 1996; Ward, 1982). 
Absolute deviance in estimation of economic differences. The degree to which 
participants’ estimations of economic differences deviated from measures of actual economic 
differences constituted their absolute deviance score. For each of the 22 items, the absolute 
deviance score was the same as the positive value of the deviance score. This means that for 
those who overestimated economic differences, their absolute deviance score was the same as 
their deviance scores, whereas for those who underestimated economic differences (i.e. having a 
negative deviance score), their deviance score made into a positive value was used as a measure 
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of absolute deviance. The internal consistency of the absolute deviance scores was quite high as 
Cronbach’s alpha = .87.  
Underestimation of economic differences. The degree to which participants 
underestimated the magnitude of economic differences was measured by inversing their negative 
deviance score. Those who were correct in their estimations or overestimated economic 
differences (i.e. having a deviance score >= 0) had an underestimation score of 0. The internal 
consistency for all 22 underestimation scores was high as Cronbach’s alpha = .84.  
Overestimation of economic differences. Participants’ degree of overestimation of 
economic differences was measured by using their positive deviance scores. Those who were 
correct in their estimations or underestimated economic differences (i.e. having a deviance score 
<= 0) had an overestimation score of 0. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for all 22 
overestimation scores was .89. 
 
Procedure and ethics 
Prior to data collection, three pilot studies were carried out. The first pilot study was 
conducted in order to outline the most frequent incorrect responses to free-response estimation 
items measuring the dependent variables, which were to be used as distractors in multiple-choice 
items in the main study. The second pilot study was conducted in order to check that the 
difficulty level of estimation items was reasonable and the third pilot study aimed to check the 
time requirement for filling out the questionnaire. 
Participants were recruited via online forums and on various campus sites of Lund 
University and Malmö University in Sweden. Those recruited via online forums filled out a web 
based questionnaire and those recruited at campus sites filled out a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire. The contents of the web based and paper-and-pencil questionnaires were identical. 
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The study was conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations concerning ethical 
conduct within psychological research (APA Manual, 2010). Prior to their participation in the 
study, all respondents gave their consent and were informed on the procedure and the overall aim 
of the study. All participants were guaranteed anonymity, confidentiality and the possibility to 
withdraw at any time.  
 
Results 
The aim of the present study was to examine how and why people misperceive the 
magnitude of economic differences in various populations. To test the hypotheses, three 
regression analyses were conducted; one for each dependent variable. Moreover, exploratory 
analyses were carried out in order to attend to methodological issues of the study. 
 
Preliminary analyses 
Prior to any hypothesis testing, preliminary analyses were conducted in order to ensure 
that there were no violations of the assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and 
homoscedasticity. The analyses indicated one violation of these assumptions. Specifically, an 
examination of multivariate outliers revealed a Mahalanobis Distance score well below the 
recommended threshold of p >.001. This outlier was omitted from the subsequent analyses. 
 
News consumption 
A two-step hierarchical multiple regression analysis was carried out including all the 
independent variables predicting absolute deviance. Frequency of news consumption, rationality 
measures and economic ideology motivation were entered in the first step; whereas abstract-
mindedness was entered in the second step, as to control for the other predictors. The results of 
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the regression analysis can be seen in Table 2. Frequency of news consumption predicted lower 
absolute deviance in estimations of economic differences to a statistically significant level, p = 
.001. This result is in line with the hypothesis that those who consume news more frequently are 
more accurate in their estimations of economic differences. 
 
Table 2.  
Results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting absolute deviance in estimations of 
economic differences. 
Predictor t  ∆F df ∆R
2
 
Step 1 
News consumption
 
Cognitive reflection
 
AOT 
Economic ideology motivation
 
Step 2 
Abstract-mindedness 
 
-3.50 
0.51 
-1.27 
3.92 
 
-0.36 
 
-0.23** 
0.03 
-0.09 
0.27** 
 
-0.02 
6.45 
 
 
 
 
0.17 
4, 218 
 
 
 
 
1, 217 
0.11** 
 
 
 
 
0.00 
Abbreviations. AOT = actively open-minded thinking 
**p < .01 
 
Rationality 
As can be seen in Table 2, the results indicated that neither cognitive reflection, p = .61, 
nor actively open-minded thinking, p = .21, significantly predicted absolute deviance in 
estimations of economic differences. Thus, no support was found for the hypothesis that 
rationality predicts accuracy in estimations of economic differences. 
 
Economic ideology motivation 
 As is demonstrated in Table 2, economic ideology motivation significantly predicted 
absolute deviance in estimations of economic differences, p < .001. This result is in line with the 
hypothesis that economic ideology motivation predicts inaccuracy in estimations of economic 
differences. 
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Abstract-mindedness 
The results of the analysis testing whether individual differences in abstract-mindedness 
predict lower levels of absolute deviance in estimation of economic differences, even when 
controlling for the influence of news consumption, rationality and economic ideology motivation, 
can be seen in Table 2. The hypothesis that abstract-mindedness predicts accuracy in estimations 
of economic differences was not supported, p = .72. 
 
Concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism 
The hypothesis that concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism are associated with 
underestimation of economic differences, even when controlling for the influence of news 
consumption, rationality and economic ideology motivation, was tested by conducting a three-
step hierarchical multiple regression analysis. The control variables constituting of news 
consumption, rationality measures and economic ideology motivation were entered in the first 
step. To see if concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism respectively predicted 
underestimation, these variables were entered in the second step. Because the hypothesis assumes 
that there is an interaction effect between concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism, an 
interaction variable was computed which represented the value of the concrete-mindedness score 
(i.e. reversed abstract-mindedness score) multiplied with the political-economic ideology score. 
This interaction variable was entered in the third step of the regression. The dependent variable 
was the degree of underestimation of the magnitude of economic differences and the results of 
the regression analysis can be seen in Table 3. The results indicated that there was no interaction 
effect of concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism on underestimation of economic 
differences, when controlling for news consumption, rationality and economic ideology 
motivation, p = .85. Thus, the hypothesis that concrete-mindedness and economical conservatism 
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is associated with underestimation of economic differences is not supported in the present study. 
However, the results indicated a main effect of economic conservatism, such that economic 
conservatism predicts underestimation of economic differences, even when controlling for news 
consumption, rationality and economic ideology motivation, p = .03. 
 
Table 3.  
Results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting underestimation of economic 
differences. 
Predictor t  ∆F df ∆R
2
 
Step 1 Control variables 
News consumption
 
Cognitive reflection
 
AOT 
Step 2 Main effects 
Concrete-mindedness 
Economic conservatism 
Step 3 Interaction effect 
CM x EC 
 
-0.72 
-1.20 
-0.27 
 
0.71 
2.20 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.05 
-0.09 
-0.02 
 
0.05 
0.16* 
 
-0.04 
0.85 
 
 
 
2.54 
 
 
0.04 
3, 219 
 
 
 
2, 217 
 
 
1, 216 
0.011 
 
 
 
0.023† 
 
 
0.000 
Abbreviations. AOT = actively open-minded thinking; CM = concrete-mindedness; EC = 
economic conservatism 
†
p<0.10 
*p < .05 
 
Concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism 
A three-step hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis 
that concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism jointly predicts overestimation of economic 
differences, even when controlling for the influence of news consumption, rationality and 
economic ideology motivation. The control variables measuring news consumption, rationality 
and economic ideology motivation were entered in the first step, whereas concrete-mindedness 
and economic liberalism (i.e., revered political-economic ideology score) were entered in the 
second step. An interaction variable representing concrete-mindedness scores multiplied with 
economic liberalism scores was created for this regression analysis and entered in the third step.  
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The dependent variable was degree of overestimation of the magnitude of economic differences. 
As can be seen in table 3, the results indicated no significant interaction effect of concrete-
mindedness and economic liberalism on overestimation of economic differences, p = .64. Thus 
the hypothesis that concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism predicts overestimation of 
economic differences, even when controlling for news consumption, rationality and economic 
ideology motivation was not supported. However, a main effect of economic liberalism was 
found, which indicated that economic liberalism is associated with overestimation of economic 
differences, even when controlling for news consumption, rationality and economic ideology 
motivation, p = .001. 
 
Table 4.  
Results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting overestimation of economic 
differences. 
Predictor t  ∆F df ∆R
2
 
Step 1 Control variables 
News consumption
 
Cognitive reflection
 
AOT 
Step 2 Main effects 
Concrete-mindedness 
Economic liberalism 
Step 3 Interaction effect 
CM x EL 
 
 -2.76 
1.16 
-0.02 
 
0.02 
3.23 
 
-0.47 
 
-0.19** 
0.01 
-0.00 
 
0.00 
0.22** 
 
-0.14 
2.59 
 
 
 
5.26 
 
 
0.22 
3, 219 
 
 
 
2, 217 
 
 
1, 216 
0.034† 
 
 
 
0.045** 
 
 
0.001 
Abbreviations. AOT = actively open-minded thinking; CM = concrete-mindedness; EL = 
economic liberalism 
†
p<0.10 
**p < .01 
 
Methodological issues 
Systematically missing values. Since a total of 27 participants did not respond to at least 
one of the items measuring the dependent variables, analyses were conducted in order to examine 
whether these missing values had a distorting effect on the previously described results. Firstly, 
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independent samples t-tests were conducted to see if participants who did not respond to items 
measuring the dependent variables differentiated from the rest of the sample in their levels of 
news consumption frequency, rationality, economic ideology motivation, abstract-mindedness 
and economic conservatism. A dummy variable for whether the participant had any missing 
responses for the dependent variables was used in the analyses. Results indicated that there was a 
statistically significant association between economic conservatism and whether participants had 
missing responses, t(221) = -2.15, p = .03. Specifically, those who did not respond to estimation 
items scored significantly higher on economic conservatism (M = 3.19, SD = 1.2, N = 27) than 
those who responded to all estimation items (M = 2.72, SD = 1.05, N = 196).  
Secondly, in order to rule out that missing values had an impact on the major findings of 
the present study, each hypothesis was tested while also controlling for the influence of 
systematically missing values. This was done by conducting every hypothesis test again, but with 
the dummy variable for whether the participant had any missing responses for the estimation 
items in the first step of the regression. However, each hypothesis test reached the same level of 
statistical significance regardless of whether missing responses were controlled for, indicating 
that the missing responses had no systematic effect on the main findings of the present study. 
Response formats. The estimation items that were avoided by some participants were 
those that were presented as free-response items, and thus responded to in terms of absolute 
quantities, without visual aid and responded to by a more economically liberal sample. In order to 
see if there were any systematic differences between responses using the two different response 
formats, I tested each hypothesis separately for dependent variables based on multiple-choice and 
free-response items, while also using the dummy variable for missing responses as a control 
variable. This resulted in six additional regression analyses (i.e., three analyses for each response 
format). Results indicated that when conducting hypothesis tests separately for dependent 
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variables based on multiple-choice questions, free-response questions or both types of response 
formats, there were some differences in terms of which variables reached statistical significance. 
Table 5 presents a comparison of standardized coefficients and t-values between the results which 
differed from the previously conducted hypothesis tests in terms of whether they reached 
statistical significance. Next, I will describe how each hypothesis test differed when conducting 
analyses separately for multiple-choice and free-response questions. 
 
Table 5.  
Results of hypothesis tests conducted separately for dependent variables based on multiple choice items, 
free-response items, and both multiple-choice and free-response items. 
 MC  FR  MC and FR 
 t   t   t 
DV: Absolute deviance 
News consumption 
 
-0.97 
 
-0.06 
  
-3.63 
 
-0.24** 
  
-3.50 
 
-0.23** 
Cognitive reflection 
Economy ideology 
-2.03 
1.71 
-0.14* 
0.12
†
 
 1.33 
3.94 
0.09 
0.27** 
 0.51 
3.92 
0.03 
0.27** 
DV: Underestimation 
EC 
CM x EC 
 
-0.74 
-3.72 
 
-0.05 
-0.83** 
  
3.24 
1.45 
 
0.23** 
0.32 
  
2.20 
-0.20 
 
0.16* 
-0.04 
DV: Overestimation 
EL 
CM x EL 
 
0.43 
-1.77 
 
0.03 
-0.51
†
 
  
3.76 
0.28 
 
0.26** 
0.08 
  
3.23 
-0.47 
 
0.22** 
-0.14 
Abbreviations. MC = multiple choice items, FR = free-response items, DV = dependent variable; CM = 
concrete-mindedness; EC = economical conservatism; EL = economic liberalism 
Note. Only results which differed from the hypothesis tests in terms of statistical significance are included 
in this table.  
†
p<0.10 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
 
News consumption. The hypothesis that frequency of news consumption predicts 
accuracy in estimations of economic differences was supported when using both multiple-choice 
and free-response items. However, this relationship was not significant when the dependent 
variable was based on only multiple response items, as can be seen in Table 5. This means that 
news consumption frequency is only significantly associated with accuracy in estimations of 
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economic differences when items measuring deviance in estimation are presented as free-
response questions and thus, responded to in terms of absolute quantities and without visual aid. 
Rationality. When the dependent variable included both multiple-choice and free-
response items, the hypothesis that rationality (i.e., cognitive reflection and actively open-minded 
thinking) predicts accuracy in estimation of economic differences was not supported. As can be 
seen in Table 5, cognitive reflection significantly predicted lower absolute deviance in estimation 
when using multiple-choice items. Therefore, the hypothesis was supported only when items 
were presented as multiple-choice items, and thus responded to in terms of relative quantities and 
with visual aid. 
Economic ideology motivation. The hypothesis that economic ideology motivation 
predicts inaccuracy in economic differences reached the same level of statistical significance, 
regardless of response format. 
Abstract-mindedness. The separate hypothesis analyses for testing the hypothesis that 
abstract-mindedness associated with accuracy in estimation of economic differences, even when 
controlling for news consumption, rationality and economic ideology motivation, reached the 
same level of statistical significance regardless of response format.  
Concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism. The hypothesis that concrete-
mindedness and economic conservatism jointly predicts underestimation of economic 
differences, even when controlling for news consumption, rationality and economic ideology 
motivation, was not supported when conducting hypothesis tests with a dependent variable based 
on both multiple-choice and free-response items. However, as demonstrated in Table 5, a 
significant interaction effect between concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism emerged 
when conducting analyses with only multiple-choice items as measurement of the dependent 
variable. The results indicated that when the measurement of the dependent variable was based 
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on only multiple-choice items, underestimation of economic differences was predicted by (a) 
abstract-mindedness and economic conservatism, and (b) concrete-mindedness and economic 
liberalism. The results also indicated a difference in statistical significance of the association 
between economic conservatism and underestimation of economic differences, which was 
significant when using measurement based on both response formats. The analyses conducted 
separately for multiple-choice and free-response items showed that economic conservatism only 
predicted underestimation of economic differences when the dependent variable was based on 
items presented as free-response items, and thus responded to in terms of absolute quantities. 
Concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism. The hypothesis that concrete-
mindedness and economic liberalism is associated with overestimation of economic differences, 
even when controlling for news consumption, rationality and economic ideology motivation, was 
not supported when conducting the analysis with a dependent variable based on both multiple-
choice and free-response items. When conducting the hypothesis test separately for multiple-
choice and free-response items, the results indicated that there was a near significant interaction 
effect between concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism on degree of overestimation, such 
that concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism predicted degree of overestimation of 
economic differences. Furthermore, the results indicated that the association between economic 
liberalism and underestimation—which was significant when using both response formats—was 
significant only when conducting the analysis based on items presented as free-response 
questions, and thus responded to in terms of relative quantities. 
 
Discussion 
The hypotheses of the present study were supported to various extents depending on the 
methodological approach of measuring the dependent variables. Firstly, when the dependent 
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variable was based on items measuring respondents’ estimations of economic differences by use 
of free-response items, support was found for the hypotheses that frequency of news consumption 
predicts accuracy and that economic ideology motivation predicts inaccuracy. Furthermore, when 
the dependent variable included only free-response items it was also found that economic 
conservatism significantly predicted underestimation, whereas economic liberalism significantly 
predicted overestimation. However, these results were not hypothesized. Secondly, when the 
dependent variable included only multiple-choice-items cognitive reflection significantly 
predicted accuracy in estimations, which partly supports the hypothesis that rationality predicts 
accuracy in estimations of economic differences. Furthermore, when using only multiple-choice-
items to measure the dependent variable, a significant interaction effect was found which 
indicated that underestimation of economic differences was predicted by (a) abstract-mindedness 
and economic conservatism, and (b) concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism. Results and 
implications for each hypothesis will be discussed below.  
 
Absolute deviance 
News consumption frequency. The finding that news consumption frequency was 
associated with accuracy in estimations of economic differences was in line with the first 
hypothesis. This finding supports the notion that news in various media formats generally provide 
accurate facts about the economic state of society and therefore contributes to more accurate 
estimations of economic differences among those who frequently consume news. Moreover, this 
result is in line with the proposition put forth by Kaplowitz et al. (2003; 2006) that being better 
informed about economic differences leads to greater accuracy in estimations of economic 
differences. By contrast, Headey (1991) and Chambers et al. (2014) attributed their findings of 
misperceptions of economic differences to the influence of distorted facts about the state of the 
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economy and economic distribution issues spread by the media. However, insofar as the results 
of this study indicate that peoples’ perceptions of economic differences are affected by the 
reporting of such issues in the media, the results of the present study are in line with Headey’s 
(1991) and Chambers et al.’s (2014) conjectures.  
The hypothesis that frequency of news consumption predicts accuracy in estimations of 
economic differences received different levels of statistical support depending on which of the 
two methodological approaches that were used to measure the dependent variable. The 
methodological approach for which the hypothesis received no support was signified by that 
items were (a) presented as multiple-choice items, (b) responded to in terms of relative quantities, 
and (c) presented with visual aid. While research has indicated that judgments about numerical 
concepts are more accurate when questions are presented as multiple-choice items (Ali et al., 
2016; Norman, 1988; Norman et al., 1987;  Schuwirth & Donkers, 1996; Ward, 1982) and with 
visual aid (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Hawley et al., 
2008; Lautenbach et al., 2013; Smit et al., 2016), research has also revealed that cognitive biases 
are more influential on judgments regarding numerical concepts when items are presented in 
terms of relative quantities (e.g., Bodemer et al., 2014; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Gigerenzer et 
al., 2007; Lautenbach et al., 2013; Liberali et al., 2012). Notably, some of the relative quantity-
measures in this study were similar to those used in Norton & Ariely’s (2011) study, with the 
difference that in this study those relative quantity-items were presented as multiple-choice 
questions instead of free-response questions. Norton & Ariely’s (2011) measures of estimations 
of economic differences were evaluated by Eriksson and Simpson (2012) as leading to responses 
influenced by anchoring bias (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Eriksson and Simpson (2012) argued that 
because economic differences presented in terms of relative quantities are not directly observable 
MISPERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 38 
to the perceiver, estimations require calculations of aggregates of incomes, instead of relying on 
knowledge about absolute income shares of difference income groups.  
Thus, the results of this study showing that news consumption frequency did not have a 
significant effect on estimations when they were expressed in terms of relative quantities point to 
the possibility that responses expressed as relative quantities may have been influenced more by 
anchoring bias than actual knowledge, in spite of the attempts to facilitate comprehension of 
questions about relative quantities by presenting them as multiple-choice items and with visual 
aid. These results give further support to Eriksson and Simpson’s (2012) arguments that 
capturing true perceptions of economic differences is better done by framing estimation items 
about economic differences in terms of absolute quantities. Taking this stance, the 
methodological differences in response formats will hereon be emphasized by referring to 
multiple-choice items as relative quantity-items and free-response items as absolute quantity-
items. 
Overall, this result contributes with knowledge concerning what role news consumption 
plays in predicting accuracy in estimations of economic differences, because it shows that news 
consumption frequency is associated with greater accuracy when estimations are compared to 
actual data of economic differences. 
Rationality. Results of the separate hypothesis tests for the two response formats 
indicated a significant association between cognitive reflection and accuracy in estimations of 
economic differences when estimation items were responded to in terms of relative quantities. 
This result partly supports the second hypothesis that rationality predicts accuracy in estimations 
of economic differences. This extends previous research on the association between rationality 
and accuracy in judgments (Baron, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2014; Stanovich et al., 2016) by 
showing that the association holds specifically when estimating economic differences. However, 
MISPERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 39 
the fact that the association between rationality and accuracy was significant only when 
estimation items were responded to in terms of relative quantities and when cognitive reflection 
was the measure of rationality necessitates further elaboration.  
Because cognitive reflection has been shown to reduce the impact of cognitive biases 
when making judgments (Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011) the results provide 
further support to the notion that responses to the relative quantity-items  may have been more 
influenced by cognitive biases. Inferring from this notion that responses to absolute quantity-
items thus reflect participants real perceptions of economic differences to a greater extent, the 
results suggests that accuracy in estimations of economic differences are not predicted by level of 
rationality, unless estimations are expressed in a manner that requires calculation and cognitive 
reflection. 
The question remains as to why only the cognitive reflection measure, and not the actively 
open-minded thinking measure, of rationality had a significant effect on accuracy for relative 
quantity- items. One explanation may be that cognitive reflection reduces the impact of cognitive 
biases to a greater extent than other forms of rationality. This notion has received support in a 
previous study by Toplak et al. (2011), in which it is also suggested that the CRT is a more valid 
instrument to use than measurements such as the AOT. Toplak et al. (2011) argue that because 
the CRT measures actual performance of judgments, it is more likely to reflect respondents true 
level of rationality than measures which are based on self-reports, such as the AOT. Moreover, 
the low internal consistency of the items measuring actively open-minded thinking in the present 
study may have resulted in an underestimation of the association between actively open-minded 
thinking and accuracy in estimations. Relatedly, some of the participants in this study expressed 
confusion about the meaning of items in the AOT. Though it is unclear whether the confusion 
was related to the phrasing or the semantics of the items, potential solutions to this problem in 
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future studies may be to either use better translations of items or to use a more valid measure of 
rationality. However, considering that the AOT has been validated in previous studies (Baron, 
1993; Baron et al., 2015; Haran et al., 2013) and found to decrease susceptibility to cognitive 
biases (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sá et al., 1999), the former solution is probably the most 
passable.  
Economic ideology motivation. As hypothesized, economic ideology motivation was 
found to predict inaccuracy in estimations of economic differences. However, the hypothesis was 
not supported when using only estimation items responded to in terms of relative quantities. 
Linking this to the notion that items responded to in terms of absolute quantities allow for 
estimations that better reflect participants real perceptions, the results imply that economic 
ideology motivation has an impact on people’s real perceptions of economic differences. While 
the result is in line with previous research showing that those who more strongly identifies 
with—and therefore are motivated by— their ideological beliefs have a more distorted world-
view (Gastil et al., 2011; Jost et al., 2008; Lupia, 1994; Kinsey & Popkin, 1993; Reedy et al., 
2014; Wells et al., 2009), it also extends on these studies by indicating that the relationship holds 
for estimations of economic differences in particular. 
Abstract-mindedness. The hypothesis that abstract-mindedness predicts accuracy in 
estimations of economic differences was not supported. Thus, the association between abstract-
mindedness and emphasis on psychologically distant information (Fujita & Roberts, 2010; 
Ledgerwood, Wakslak, & Wang, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 2008) and accuracy in judgments of 
psychologically distant events (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Nussbaum et al., 2006; Peetz & 
Buehler, 2012; Wening et al., 2016) could not be extended to estimations of economic differences 
in this study.  
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A potential explanation to the non-significant results could be found in research indicating 
that abstract-mindedness is associated with greater reliance on values (Agerström & Björklund, 
2009a, 2009b) and ideological beliefs (Ledgerwood, Trope, and Chaiken, 2010) when making 
judgments. By relying more on values and ideological beliefs, abstract-minded peoples’ 
estimations of economic differences may have been distorted by myside biases in this study. 
Myside bias is the tendency to not consider other arguments than those in line with one’s own 
held beliefs when making judgments (Baron, 1991; Stanovich, West & Toplak, 2013). It is a 
component of irrational thinking, and specifically, negatively linked with actively open-minded 
thinking (Baron, 1991, 1993). Unfortunately, the measure of actively open-minded thinking did 
not reach an acceptable level of reliability in the current study, and the relationship between 
abstract-mindedness, actively open-minded thinking and estimations of economic differences 
could therefore not be investigated further.  
The proposed relationship between abstract-mindedness, myside bias and estimations of 
economic differences would be in line with previous suggestions that perceptions of economic 
differences are influenced by cognitive biases (Castillo, 2011; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Evans 
et al., 1992; Wegener, 1990). Furthermore, it would be in line with the results of this study which 
revealed an association between abstract-mindedness, economic conservatism and 
underestimation of economic differences, since it suggests that those who are abstract-minded 
and economically conservative make estimations more in line with already held beliefs (i.e., the 
belief of low inequality in society). 
 
Underestimation of economic differences  
Economic conservatism. Although not hypothesized, the results indicated an association 
between economic conservatism and underestimation of economic differences when estimation 
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items were responded to in terms of absolute quantities.  This is in line with research indicating 
that compared to economically liberal people, economically conservative people perceive 
economic differences to be smaller (Chambers et al., 2014, 2015; Duch et al., 2000; 
Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017; Schlenker et al., 2012; Willis et al., 2015). Furthermore, the results 
provide support for the assumptions of SJT that economically conservative people are more 
motivated to justify the economic system by perceiving it as being more equal (Jost & 
Thompson, 2000). This is the first study to show that these associations hold when estimations 
are compared with actual data on economic differences.  
Abstract-mindedness and economic conservatism. It was hypothesized that 
underestimation of economic differences would be predicted by concrete-mindedness and 
economic conservatism. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that concrete-mindedness 
would be related to inaccuracy in estimations, as well as on research indicating that economic 
conservatism is associated with lower estimations of economic differences (Chambers et al., 
2014, 2015; Duch et al., 2000; Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017; Schlenker et al., 2012; Willis et al., 
2015) and greater justification of the economic system (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Given the 
results that abstract-mindedness was not associated with accuracy in estimations in this study, it 
was no surprise that there was also no interaction effect between concrete-mindedness and 
economic conservatism on underestimation of economic differences.  
However, contrary to the hypothesis, the results revealed an interaction effect of abstract-
mindedness and economic conservatism on underestimation of economic differences, but only 
when estimation items were responded to in terms of relative quantities. While keeping in mind 
Eriksson and Simpson’s (2012) conclusions that estimations are more likely to be anchored on an 
equal distribution when presenting items as relative quantities, this result could be interpreted as 
an indication of that people who are abstract-minded and economically conservative are more 
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susceptible to anchoring bias. Thus, the results could be explained by adding the possibility that 
abstract-minded participants may have been more susceptible to myside bias and that economic 
conservatism was found to be associated with underestimation of economic differences. 
Not only does this finding extend on CLT by delineating under which conditions abstract-
mindedness is related to underestimation of economic differences; it also extends on SJT by 
indicating that people who are abstract-minded and economically conservative are more likely to 
justify the economic system when presumably being more susceptible to anchoring bias.  
Concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism. Unexpectedly, it was also found that 
concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism was associated with underestimation of economic 
differences when estimation items were responded to in terms of relative quantities. Based on 
studies indicating that concrete-mindedness is related to optimism bias when judging the outcome 
of hypothetical events (Armor & Sackett, 2006; Peetz & Buehler, 2012; Yan & Unger; 2014) and 
the notion that cognitive biases may have been more influential when items were expressed in 
terms of relative quantities (Bodemer et al., 2014; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Gigerenzer et al., 
2007; Lautenbach et al., 2013; Liberali et al., 2012), concrete-minded participants were possibly 
more susceptible to optimism bias when responding to relative quantity-items. In combination 
with the finding that economically liberal people perceive the economic system as a greater threat 
(Kahn et al., 2017) and that the perception of system threat increases system justification (Kay et 
al., 2005), a potential explanation to the finding may be that economically liberal and concrete-
minded respondents underestimated economic differences to a greater extent because they were 
more susceptible to optimism bias and perceptions of system threat. This explanation would also 
be in line with Headey’s (1991) speculation that those who perceive economic inequality as a 
greater threat underestimate economic differences as way of reducing feelings of social injustice.  
Thus, these results extend on previous studies and theories by revealing the conditions under 
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which concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism is associated with underestimation of 
economic differences. 
 
Overestimation of economic differences 
Economic liberalism. The hypothesis that being concrete-minded and economically 
liberal predict overestimation of economic differences was not supported, most likely due to a 
failure to provide support for the hypothesis that concrete-mindedness predicts absolute deviance 
in estimations of economic differences. However, a significant association was found between 
economic liberalism and overestimation of economic differences when estimation items were 
responded to in terms of absolute quantities. This finding replicates previous studies indicating 
that compared to economically conservative people, economically liberal people perceive 
economic differences to be greater (Chambers et al., 2014, 2015; Duch et al., 2000; 
Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017; Schlenker et al., 2012; Willis et al., 2015), as well as studies on 
SJT showing that economically liberal people are generally less inclined to justify the economic 
system (Jost & Thompson, 2000). This study extends on SJT and previous studies by showing 
that estimations of economic differences of those who are more economically liberal are larger 
than actual economic differences.  
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
 The main limitations of the present study were that (a) some responses to estimation items 
were systematically missing, (b) the use of different response formats gave incoherent results, (c) 
framing estimation items in terms of numerical quantities may have induced undue bias among 
participants who have lower numeric skills and (d) lack of reliability in the measurement of 
actively open-minded thinking.  
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 Firstly, the prevalence of systematically missing values for the estimation items implied 
that some participants were more inclined than others to report their estimations of economic 
differences. An analysis testing this prediction revealed that those who systematically avoided 
some estimation items scored higher on economic conservatism. A potential reason for this may 
be that because economically conservative respondents may not generally perceive the 
implications of economic differences to be as important compared to the rest of the sample (Kahn 
et al, 2017; Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017; Willis et al., 2015), they simply cared less about filling 
in all the items concerning this matter. Moreover, the items which were avoided were those that 
were formulated in terms of absolute quantities and presented as free-response questions without 
visual aid. Thus, although research have indicated that absolute quantity-items better assess 
respondents estimations (Bodemer et al., 2014; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012; Gigerenzer et al., 
2007; Lautenbach et al., 2013; Liberali et al., 2012;), a probable explanation to the avoidance of 
those items may be that the lack of alternatives and visual aid required more effort and thus were 
more difficult to fill out. This may in turn have led respondents less inclined to put effort into 
their participation to skip those items. A way to circumvent this kind of caveat in future research 
may be to use incentives for participants in order to motivate them to put more effort into their 
participation (Armor & Sackett, 2006). Another suggestion is to use a shorter and more 
comprehensible measurement format; perhaps by investigating fewer variables at a time, using 
multiple-choice items and/or using items with visual aid. 
Secondly, concerning the inclusion of both relative- and absolute quantity-items, it was 
intended to increase the validity of the measurement of estimations of economic differences by 
using as many items as possible that aimed to measure the same construct. In addition, given that 
the construction of estimation items were dependent on extant data on economic differences, 
which are most often described in terms of relative quantities, it was considered necessary to 
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include such estimation items. However, the results showing different levels of statistical 
significance for hypotheses depending on response format indicated a lack of validity for the 
measure including both response formats. This is clearly a limitation of the study, if intending to 
use only the invalid measurement based on both response formats. However, the invalidity of the 
unitized measure coincidentally enabled a comparison of results emanating from the two 
response formats. This comparison in turn led to new empirical findings regarding how 
estimations of economic differences differ depending on assessment method. Although I 
encourage future studies to use different methodologies in order to map out under which 
conditions associations between psychological factors and estimations of economic differences 
exist and when they do not, I suggest that such initiatives are theoretically based from the start as 
to avoid unexpected outcomes such as in the present study. 
Thirdly, framing economic differences as numerical quantities in this study was necessary 
in order to enable the comparison between respondents’ estimates and actual data. However, a 
potential confounding factor that this study failed to include was level of numeracy. Numeracy is 
the ability to apply and reason with numerical concepts (Brooks & Pui, 2010) and is thus likely to 
predict accuracy in estimation of economic differences when these are framed as numerical 
quantities. It is therefore suggested that future studies intending to investigate the associations 
between psychological factors and estimations of economic differences framed as numerical 
quantities control for the influence of numeracy. It is also encouraged for future studies to 
investigate perceptions of economic differences among those lower in numeracy. A suggested 
approach for doing so would be to use methods devoid of numerical concepts, such as rank-order 
measures or qualitative methods. 
Lastly, a limitation of this study was the failure to achieve an acceptable level of 
reliability in the measurement of actively open-minded thinking. Future studies attempting to 
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investigate the association between actively open-minded thinking and estimations of economic 
differences are thus encouraged to use a more valid translation of the AOT than the one used in 
the current study. Thus, in response to the limitations of the present study, future research should 
(a) use incentives and/or more comprehensive estimation measures to prevent loss of responses, 
(b) take into account the potential differences in results before using different methodological 
approaches, (c) control for level of numeracy, and (d) use a more reliable measure of actively 
open-minded thinking. 
Further, future studies aiming to investigate the association between abstract-mindedness, 
political-economic ideology and misperceptions of the magnitude of economic differences may 
want to test the potential mediating effects of myside bias and optimism bias. Specifically, future 
studies could investigate whether myside bias—which is speculated to mediate the effect of 
abstract-mindedness and economic conservatism on underestimation of economic differences—
would be activated if the criterion variable involved estimations of the severity of an issue that is 
typically emphasized by conservatives (e.g., declined economic growth). The results of the 
present study suggest there would be no such mediation effect for abstract-mindedness and 
economic conservatism, but for abstract-mindedness and economic liberalism. Similarly, future 
studies could investigate the potentially mediating effect of optimism bias by testing whether 
concrete-mindedness and economic conservatism would predict underestimation of societal 
issues perceived as a greater threat among conservatives, which the results of this study suggests 
it would. 
Future studies within SJT may investigate further the influence of abstract-mindedness 
and response format on economic system justification. The potential explanations for the 
association between abstract-mindedness and system justification could be tested by investigating 
under which conditions abstract-mindedness influences conservatives’ and liberals’ level of 
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system justification. For instance, the results of this study suggest that the aggregated effects of 
abstract-mindedness and economical conservatism would result in greater economic system 
justification, compared to the independent effects of each, when making judgment under 
uncertain conditions. Similarly, it would be expected that the aggregated effects of concrete-
mindedness and economical liberalism would result in greater economic system justification, 
compared to the independent effects of each, when making judgment under uncertain conditions. 
What is more, seeing as economic perceptions vary depending on country and culture 
(Cohen, 2004) and that the present study was based in Sweden, future studies are encouraged to 
replicate the findings of the current study in other countries and cultures. 
 
Conclusion 
This study generated new knowledge regarding how and why people misperceive the 
magnitude of economic differences in society. Specifically, it was found that news consumption 
frequency and lower economic ideology motivation predicted accuracy in estimation of economic 
differences. Although not hypothesized, it was also found that economic conservatism is 
associated with underestimation of economic differences, whereas economic liberalism is 
associated with overestimation of economic differences. These findings are in line with previous 
studies indicating that compared to economically liberal people, economically conservative 
people generally perceive economic differences to be smaller (Chambers et al., 2014, 2015; Duch 
et al., 2000; Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017; Schlenker et al., 2012; Willis et al., 2015) and are 
more inclined to justify the economic system (Jost & Thompson, 2000). However, this is the first 
study to show that this relationship also holds when comparing estimations of economic 
differences with actual data of economic differences. 
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The results also supported the notion put forth in previous research that measuring 
estimations of numerical values in terms of relative quantities increases the risk of responses 
being influenced by cognitive biases; both in general (Bodemer et al., 2014; Gigerenzer et al., 
2007; Lautenbach et al., 2013; Liberali et al., 2012) and when measuring estimations of economic 
differences in particular (Eriksson & Simpson, 2012). Assuming that relative quantity-items 
increased the impact of cognitive biases in estimations, the present study indicates that abstract-
minded conservatives and concrete-minded liberals underestimate economic differences when 
under the influence of cognitive biases. The result indicating that those who are abstract-minded 
and economically conservative underestimate economic differences was not in line with what 
was hypothesized in the present study, but could be explained by previous studies showing that 
abstract-mindedness is associated with greater reliance on values (Agerström & Björklund, 
2009a, 2009b) and ideology beliefs (Ledgerwood, Trope, and Chaiken, 2010) when making 
judgments, and that economic conservatism is associated with lower estimations of economic 
differences (Chambers et al., 2014, 2015; Duch et al., 2000; Rodriguez‐Bailon et al., 2017; 
Schlenker et al., 2012; Willis et al., 2015) and greater justification of the economic system (Jost 
& Thompson, 2000).  
The unexpected finding that concrete-mindedness and economic liberalism predicts 
underestimation of economic differences could be explained by previous findings indicating that 
concrete-minded are more susceptible to optimism bias (Armor & Sackett, 2006; Peetz & 
Buehler, 2012; Yan & Unger; 2014) and that economic liberals perceive economic inequality as a 
greater threat (Kahn et al., 2017). Thus, in line with SJT it would be expected that those who are 
concrete-minded and economically liberal would underestimate economic differences as a way to 
reduce the perception of system threat (Kay et al., 2005). 
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Overall, these findings offer an explanation to the inconsistent results in previous research 
showing both that people underestimate (Headey, 1991; Kaplowitz et al., 2003, 2006; Norton & 
Ariely, 2011; Eriksson & Simpson, 2012) and overestimate (Chambers et al., 2014) economic 
differences, by suggesting that the direction of misperceptions of economic differences depends 
on level of abstract-mindedness, political-economic ideology and response format. The findings 
of this study also contribute to CLT and SJT by revealing under which conditions abstract-
mindedness and political-economic ideologies—both independently and jointly—are related to 
misperceptions of economic differences, and thus economic system justification. 
While in line with previous studies, the findings of this study also offer a new 
understanding of how and why people underestimate the magnitude of economic differences. 
Specifically, this is the first study to show that accuracy in estimations of economic differences is 
predicted by news consumption frequency and that inaccuracy in estimations of economic 
differences is predicted by economic ideology motivation. This is also the first study to show that 
the direction of misperceptions of economic differences depend on level of abstract-mindedness, 
political-economic ideology and response format. What is more, the present study suggests that 
reported estimations of economic differences are most valid when asked about in terms of 
absolute quantities. 
Evidently, people are detached from the reality of economic inequality to various degrees 
depending on a number of psychological factors. This detachment may lead to misguided 
political support, as well as misjudgments and biased decision-making regarding economic 
issues. What is more, misperceptions of economic differences may lead to undue stereotyping of 
people belonging to different economic strata than one’s own (Kaplowitz et al., 2003; 2006). 
Generating more knowledge about how and why people misperceive the magnitude of economic 
differences is therefore of great value, especially seeing as perceptions of economic inequality is 
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closely interlocked with voting behavior (e.g., Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013; Jacoby, 2010; 
Wilkin, Haller & Norpoth, 1997) and thus political-economic policy-making. Hopefully, this 
study may offer a new empirical ground on which to base more robust testing of related theories 
in this area of research in the future. 
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